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Does a Conspiracy to Terminate
At-Will Employment Constitute
an Injury to Property?

Glane

by BarbaraJ. Fick
PREVIEW of United States Supreme Court Cases, pages 85-87. © 1998 American Bar Association.

vation, against any one or more of
the conspirators."
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Barbara J. Fick is an
associate professor
of law at Notre Dame Law School,
Notre Dame, IN
(219) 631-5864.

In the years succeeding the close of
the Civil War, Congress passed a
series of legislative enactments
aimed at ensuring the implementation of the 13th, 14th and 15th
Amendments, and suppressing the
disorder and violence plaguing the
Southern United States during this
period. Known collectively as the
Reconstruction Era Civil Rights
Acts, these statutes are currently
codified at 42 U.S.C. §§1981-1988.
This case involves a question of
statutory construction regarding the
language of 42 U.S.C. §1985.

4-

- ---4

IssuE
Does the termination of an at-will
employee, pursuant to a conspiracy
to retaliate against the employee for
appearing in court and to deter him
from testifying, constitute "injury to
property" compensable under 42
U.S.C. §1985(2) and (3)?

S

Michael Haddle was an at-will
employee employed in the state of
Georgia by Healthmaster, Inc.
Jeannette Garrison, Dennis Kelly
and G. Peter Molloy were corporate
officers and directors of
Healthmaster.
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In this case, the Court is
asked to determine
whether the termination
Iof an at-will employee
can be compensable
under 42 U.S.C. §1985,
one of the Reconstruction
Civil Rights Acts.
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In March 1995, Healthmaster,
Garrison and Kelly were indicted by
a federal grand jury on Medicare
fraud and other criminal charges.
41.,
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42 U.S.C. §1985(2) and (3) provide
that "if two or more persons...
conspire to deter, by force, intimidation, or threat, any party or witness in any court of the United
States from attending such court or
from testifying to any matter pending therein ... or to injure such
party or witness in his person or
property on account of his having so
attended or testified ... the party
so injured or deprived may have an
action for the recovery of damages
occasioned by such injury or depri-

(Continued on Page 86)
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Haddle cooperated with federal
authorities in the investigation and
was subpoenaed to testify before a
grand jury; his testimony, however,
was not presented. Haddle was also
a potential witness for the subsequent criminal trial.
After the indictments,
Healthmaster's operations, along
with Haddle's employment, were
transferred to Healthmaster Home
Health Care, Inc. ("HHHC"), a
wholly owned subsidiary of
Healthmaster. HHHC was placed
in Chapter 11 bankruptcy, and G.
Peter Molloy was appointed trustee.
The bankruptcy court barred
Garrison and Kelly from participating in the affairs of HHHC.
On June 21, 1995, Molloy terminated Haddle, allegedly as a result of an
agreement with Garrison and Kelly,
to retaliate against Haddle because
he had cooperated with the federal
investigation and to deter him from
testifying in the pending criminal
trial.
Haddle filed a lawsuit in federal district court against Garrison, Kelly,
and Molloy, among others, alleging
that his termination violated 42
U.S.C. §1985. The court, in an
unpublished opinion, dismissed the
case for failure to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted. The
court held that loss of at-will
employment does not constitute
"injury to property" within the
meaning of §1985, and therefore is
not a type of injury recognized as
compensable under the statute.
The Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed the district court's
decision in an unpublished opinion.

CASE ANALYSIS
The Respondents (Garrison, Kelly,
Molloy, et al.) assert that the district
court's decision is consistent with
both the Supreme Court's interpretation of similar language contained
in the other, contemporaneously
enacted statutes that constitute the
Reconstruction Era Civil Rights
Acts, as well as the legislative history of 42 U.S.C. §1985.
In Johnson v. Railway Express
Agency, 421 U.S. 454 (1975), the
Court determined that 42 U.S.C.
§1981 prohibited race discrimination in private employment. The
Court based its decision on the language in the statute granting to all
persons the right "to make and
enforce contracts," and not on the
language guaranteeing full and equal
benefit of the law "for the security
of persons and property." Subsequently, in Patterson v. McLean
Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989),
the Court again emphasized that
employment rights were protected
by the "make and enforce contracts" language.
In City of Memphis v. Greene, 451
U.S. 100 (1981), the Supreme Court
held that 42 U.S.C. §1982 protected
a broad expanse of property interests. The lower courts, however,
have consistently held that §1982
does not encompass termination of
at-will employment because such
employees do not have a property
interest in their employment.
42 U.S.C. §1983 provides a remedy
for, inter alia, deprivation of property without due process of law. The
Court in Board of Regents v. Roth,
408 U.S. 564 (1972), held that property interests are not created by the
Constitution but are defined by
sources such as state law. To have a
property interest, the Court held, a
person must have "a legitimate

claim of entitlement to it." In
Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341
(1976), the Court was presented
with a claim under §1983 in which
an at-will police officer alleged that
his employment had been terminated without due process. The Court
held that, as an at-will employee,
the plaintiff held his job at the will
and pleasure of the employer and
therefore he had no property interest in his job.
Specifically with regard to §1985,
the legislative history contains no
reference to employment. Rather,
Congress was concerned with
injuries to persons or property such
as murder, beatings, or home invasions. At the time of the passage of
§1985, there were no limitations on
an employer's right to terminate
employment - employees were not
deemed to have a property right in
employment. Moreover,
Respondents assert that at-will
employees in Georgia do not have
a property interest in their
employment.
Lastly, Respondents argue that the
interest protected by §1985(2) is
the right to fully litigate one's own
case in federal court. Since Haddle
was not a party to any of the judicial proceedings in this case, his discharge did not in any way impede
his ability to effectively present his
own case in court.
Haddle, on the other hand, argues
that the district court's interpretation misconstrued the phrase
"injury to person or property" found
in §1985. This language is intended
to specify the broadest possible
range of injuries. The purpose was
to indicate that the plaintiff must
suffer some economic damage that
would be the basis for a commonlaw tort suit. The language was used
to distinguish tort-based remedies

Issue No. 2
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"injuries to person or property"
from contract-based remedies.

Injury to property is not limited to
damage to tangible property but
rather encompasses various types of
monetary losses. For example, in
Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S.
330 (1979), the Supreme Court
interpreted the phrase "injury to
property," as used in the Clayton
Act, to include higher prices paid
by consumers as a result of anticompetitive behavior. Likewise,
termination of employment causes
monetary losses such as lost wages
and benefits.
The policy behind §1985(2) supports a finding that termination of
employment constitutes an injury to
property. When it enacted the
Reconstruction Era Civil Rights
Acts, Congress was concerned with
threats to the administration of justice in the federal courts caused by
intimidation and retaliation. While
the methods of witness intimidation
used today may be different than
those used after the Civil War, the
language of the statute was intentionally written broadly enough to
encompass a wide variety of conduct. Economic coercion caused by
discharging employees can be as
effective a method of witness intimidation as threats of violence.
Haddle admits that his employment
was at-will but contends that under
Georgia law he had a protectible
interest in his continued employment. In Troy v. Interfinancial,
Inc., 320 S.E.2d 872 (1984), the
Georgia Court of Appeals held that
an employee "has a property right
in his contract of employment
(... even if it is at the will of the
employer) which may not be unlawfully interfered with by another."
Moreover, it is clear that an at-will
employee cannot be discharged for
reasons that violate federal law. In
this case, it is alleged that third par-
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ties (Garrison and Kelly) unlawfully
interfered with Haddle's employment by HHHC, and the reason for
the interference was to deter Haddle
from testifying, in violation of
§1985(2).
Lastly, Haddle argues that public
policy supports protecting witnesses
who lose their jobs as a result of testifying in federal court proceedings.
Such protection is needed to ensure
the integrity of judicial proceedings.
Indeed, many states have created
public policy exceptions to the
employment-at-will doctrine to protect employees in such situations.
Other states, however, have refused
to recognize such an exception. In
the absence of an interpretation of
§1985(2) providing this protection,
ensuring the integrity of federal
court proceedings will depend upon
the vagaries of state law.
SIGNIFICANCE
This case turns on a relatively narrow issue of statutory construction,
which is unlikely to have exceedingly broad ramifications. Even if the
Court finds that termination of
employment-at-will constitutes an
injury to property, this interpretation would not provide a general
federal tort remedy for all such terminations. Rather, in order to be
actionable under Section 1985(2),
there must be not only the injury to
property, but such injury must be as
a result of a conspiracy for the purpose of deterring a party or witness
from attending, or testifying in, federal court.
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